Bots Against US Read online

  ● Hacked state and local election authorities

  ● Hacked election database vendors

  ● Hacked voting machines ***(jury still out on this exactly)***

  ● Hacked social media with fake accounts and bots

  ● Hacked news with fake websites, fake news

  ● Hacked the DNC

  ● Hacked other Democratic election groups

  ● Leaked information in coordinated method through 3rd parties to Wikileaks, on a coordinated release schedule that was also coordinated with the twitter accounts of both Russian media and Trump and his associates.

  Just to start with.

  This is a constitutional crisis that makes Watergate look tiny in comparison.

  Chapter 16.

  Future Actions to Take Now.

  In this short book, I have attempted to lay out what happened as I saw it ,live through the eyes of someone used to looking at information war and cyber war.

  The United States of America was attacked with 1s and 0s, with psychometrics and computational propaganda combined with psychological operations and other aspects of information war for much of 2015 and all of 2016.

  According to the Mueller Report, the Russians actually began their first foray in election interference in the United States as early as 2012.

  Which leaves as many questions as it answers.

  One question in particular I am now asking is, “If they were interfering in our elections that early, how good have they become at doing it without us paying attention?”

  How many states have they successfully penetrated in one way or another without anyone knowing or paying attention?

  Moving forward, the United States needs to adopt a national strategy, combined with 50 state strategies designed at securing elections. This has to happen to protect against digital hacks and psychological operations, as well as other forms of information warfare that are not necessarily hacking per se.

  So what lessons were learned in 2016 that can be applied to all future national and state/local elections alike?

  What steps can be taken now to start to address the critical issues facing election security in all 50 states, reflecting on both federal and non-federal races?

  I have some ideas:

  All 50 states need to implement countermeasures up and down the full supply chain of election machines, software, vendors, vendors access, and remote back doors.

  All 50 states need to budget money for the ongoing anti-propaganda and anti-fake-news training needed for all ages of the populace

  The federal government needs to invest heavily in creating a permanent committee made up of defense, treasury, state, CIA, NSA, FBI, Secret Service, Air Force and Navy, Army and Marines, to have a 24-hour response team available to any state in need of extra support in cyber security, anti-computational propaganda in any election, whether federal, state or local.

  The US government needs to enforce certain cyber security standards in all 50 states when it comes to elections. No state should be allowed to have a hackable election system.

  All 50 states need to implement paper receipts/auditable machines in every district, in every county, and in every state.

  The federal government needs to create a website that lists previous computational propaganda attacks. This needs to show what they looked like so people can reference them and learn from the past. This should be added to after every local, state, and federal election.

  Chapter 17.

  A Post-Facto Description of What Happened With Flynn and Kian

  As I stated in the early part of the book, I did indeed have a brief set of discussions with General Michael Flynn (Ret.) and Bijan Kian (Rafekian) in late 2015 and early 2016. This was conducted through their company, Flynn Intel.

  So, the story is this:

  I was serving on the first advisory board for a company called The Intelligence Community, LLC. At some point after I was already on this advisory board, the company also invited Retired General Flynn to join. This was in 2015. In late October 2015, I met both General Flynn and Bijan Kian at a reception held at the W Hotel in Washington, DC.

  At this reception Bijan was asking me questions about Digijaks, my company. We set a follow-up phone call to see if there was any space to have some sort of business relationship.

  We signed a non-disclosure agreement so we could talk more freely. This was interesting because while I learned more information, I also did not. On each and every occasion, I would ask how the cyber security technology they might be white labeling or licensing from Digijaks might be used, and by whom.

  Each time, I would not get an answer or it would be a very vague set of words strung together to sound like something else. Never something like, “oh we are going to license to our clients, X and Y” or anything remotely that transparent. This was quite bothersome. Also, they were constantly mentioning that they were “talking” to other cyber security companies; and thus we were but one of many. This was also quite bothersome, as they would never tell us who.

  Ultimately, those companies that did end up doing business with them ended up supplying the digital armament and cyber war tech and know-how to make up the bulk of the “Digital Army”. The digital army that General Flynn bragged about on so many occasions in regard to the 2016 Trump Campaign.

  Could this have included hackers? Yes.

  Could this have included trying to manipulate the media through placing fake websites, fake social media accounts and fake search results to seed their information war? Yes.

  Could this have included engaging unethical hackers or black-hat hacking companies in their pursuits? Yes.

  In our case, they were asking about ways to alter search results and also create offensive cyber weapons that could not be traced. They were occasionally asking about bots, and other things, but basically it was this part.

  This sounds pretty tame right? Well, actually, what they were asking about is a baseline of information warfare; if an attacker controls the information space, then they can mold thought and action at scale.

  I can state affirmatively that we dodged a nuclear-sized bullet when we decided to walk away. I was quite worried about what they were doing since they were being so weird about ever telling us, even after being under an NDA.

  I have the unfortunate distinction of being the one to suggest to General Flynn that he stop allowing his son to speak for him on Twitter, and instead get his own Twitter account. This would have been early March 2016.

  I also dealt with his son and was not happy about that. When we first started talking to them, Flynn and Kian seemed to have a proper staff at Flynn Intel, including a guy who was the “head of cyber.”

  But soon, there were multiple personnel changes inside Flynn Intel, and these probably were the harbingers of the bad things to come. Suddenly I was communicating with Flynn, Jr., who was the General’s “Chief of Staff.”

  More importantly, my company is small. We are highly selective of time being spent discussing partnerships. If I had known in November 2015 about their ties to Russia and Turkey, I would have run - not walked - away as fast as I could.

  In April 2016, I gave a speech at the National GEOINT Conference sponsored by USGIF. That year it was in Orlando, Florida. As a result of my speech, and the people who helped to bring me to that conference, I ended up being in a tight circle of former and current intelligence officials of the United States.

  At one point during the few days I was there, a senior former Deputy Director of the CIA, took me aside, grabbed my arm, and point-blank asked me what I was doing with Flynn. I answered honestly, which was nothing, and also told him why. He then relaxed and let go of my arm.

  Then he asked me if I knew what was happening with Flynn and Trump. I said I had no idea, because I didn’t, but added that if Flynn was going to join Trump’s campaign, it would make me think even less of him.

  Below is a string of tweets I did about this set of events.

  Silberberg Verified a
ccount @IdeaGov 17 Dec 2018

  When someone asks for a way to communicate without being surveilled and listened to... and confuses which side someone else is on, all in one conversation. It was maddening and hilarious all at once. That's what had me telling to go F himself.

  Alan W. Silberberg‏Verified account @IdeaGov 17 Dec 2018

  Their company was trying to white-label some cyber security stuff and would not reveal who end user was or who they worked with. They approached many cyber security companies. The ones who ended up with them tied to the digital army stuff and other things.

  Alan W. Silberberg‏Verified account @IdeaGov 17 Dec 2018

  Kian tried to get me to hire someone in LA I had never met and who had no experience in cyber security.

  Alan W. Silberberg‏Verified account @IdeaGov 17 Dec 2018

  also tried to get us involved in some nuclear power plant thing bc he knew we work w hedge funds. Through late 2015 early 2016 this was going on, not sure if they remembered I was Clinton alumni, still support them now. So I got into conversations I could not believe.

  Alan W. Silberberg‏Verified account @IdeaGov 17 Dec 2018

  had to deal with Jr - who used to use his Twitter account to literally speak for his dad, had no concept of cyber security or business and filled with non-stop hard right-wing conspiracy theories. All of them were so right wing as to not have a left side at all.

  Alan W. Silberberg‏Verified account @IdeaGov 17 Dec 2018

  We balked at dealing with them because they could never tell us who an end user was, nor did they seem eager to share any details about their clients even though they were trying to white label from us. Also lots of strange stuff going on; now we know what.

  Alan W. Silberberg‏Verified account @IdeaGov 17 Dec 2018

  We also balked bc of their ever right ward leaning vision and Flynn dealing with trumpo. At a speech I gave later in 2016, a senior US intelligence official took me by the arm and questioned me about Flynn. When I said we were not doing anything with them and why, he relaxed.

  Alan W. Silberberg‏Verified account @IdeaGov 17 Dec 2018

  Looking back now, I know a few things, number one being the strange stuff they refused to tell us, was this treason/illegal shit. It smelled bad, felt bad and we were happy to walk away then + even happier now. More importantly I know they were seeking digital weapons. @kelly2277

  Alan W. Silberberg‏Verified account @IdeaGov 17 Dec 2018

  has been on that issue for a while. They were constantly trying to get us to cough up cyber process/method/ data. We did not. After March 2016, we ceased communications. Until March 2017 when Kian reached out to me to "talk:" He wanted way to communicate w.o being surveilled.

  Alan W. Silberberg‏Verified account @IdeaGov 17 Dec 2018

  They approached several cyber security companies about "white labeling" services. Anyone who fell into that trap would have been handing over their goods to Russia and Turkey at the least. The firms that did sign up with them, are really private intelligence firms, not cyber.

  Alan W. Silberberg‏Verified account @IdeaGov 17 Dec 2018

  The firms that did agree to work with Flynn + Kian were undoubtedly part of the digital army of hackers that Flynn referred to in multiple occasions. They were seeking offensive cyber weapons, and ways to alter search results and social media. Lots of questions about bots...

  Alan W. Silberberg‏Verified account @IdeaGov 17 Dec 2018

  It was the last conversation, the one Kian had with me about communication without being surveilled ... that led me to tell him, in WhatsApp, text + email to go fuck himself. I refused to help someone who treasoned/espionaged.

  ****

  There is more to it. But this is the short version.

  Chapter 18.

  Samples of Bots and weaponized Information in 2016 and Later.

  Samples of bot/weaponized information in 2016

  ● Anything distributed by Wikileaks/DCLeaks/Guccifer 2.0. Period. Even if it was based on or solely using hacked emails, it was also weaponized, targeted and re-targeted based on the psychometric tools in use.

  ● The Trump campaign designed 6.1 million specifically targeted Facebook ads, using the information Cambridge Analytica scraped from Facebook. These ads were in some cases targeted to specific people, families, and certainly to specific subgroups in rural communities as well as other previously identified groups.

  ● Twitter is reported to have had as high as a 20% fake account rate during the 2016 election.

  ● Facebook admits to there being millions of faked accounts as well as fake news websites they allowed to purchase advertising.

  ● Reddit has admitted to fake accounts, bots, and weaponized information being used.

  ● Google / YouTube have been remarkably quiet, but are known to have had high fake account/fake news websites and tremendously high ad purchases by shadowy groups during the 2016 election.

  ● Snapchat, Instagram, WhatsApp, Vimeo, and other social media websites are also known to have been caught up in the fake accounts/bots/ dissemination of fake and/or weaponized news from fake websites.