Bots Against US Read online

  I was getting pounded by bots and human trolls alike, as was anyone else speaking the truth about the coordinated relationship between Trump/Putin/Kremlin and their media advocates and surrogates.

  I called out as many as I could, especially the human trolls coming from the Kremlin/Russian-associated groups.

  Here is one perfect example, in which I call out Wikileaks and Russia together in one tweet. Only one person actually responded to the tweet. This was done by a person self-identifying as “advising Julian Assange.” His response was/is the perfect example of the Russian disinformation tactic known as “whataboutism.”

  I often referred to Wikileaks as Wikileex or wikiblahblah simply so as not to get bombarded by their bots and or their human trolls. This time, one of them popped up.

  I also was calling out the verified Twitter accounts that were spreading the propaganda/weaponized information being spread by Wikileaks and the Trump Campaign, as well as the Kremlin media outlets and associated Russian media groups.

  A good example is this one, where a known GOP agitator was trying to make the case that NBC News somehow was doing something wrong by not airing “enough” WikiLeaks content.

  Again, I called it Wikiblahblah and asked if he was paid in rubles, too. Usually when I would do that, either they would respond with an eruption of angry explosive tweets or their supporters would, or often it would go silent, like the truth hurt too much.

  Sometimes I would use humor to bring people’s attention to what was going on, sometimes just because I was tired of getting slammed by the bot armies whenever I made a real point.

  So for example, in this one, putting two things together like Putin and white supremacists supporting Trump was easier to do with a bit of humor.

  Ultimately, I got the wrong kind of attention from Russia. They decided to use tweets like this one below to harass people.

  What is missing from this screenshot and also the live tweet, is that they originally had tagged this tweet with myself and roughly five other people.

  Since then, those tags have been removed. There was a second one as well, now as of 2019 completely removed (deleted) including the original content and tags. I am sure there were many more that were not involving me.

  In this one, they seem to both admit to the hacking, and sharing with Wikileaks all at once.

  Was quite a stunning moment to see myself tagged (now removed) in this tweet.

  Chapter 13.

  US Intelligence Community Assessment

  In October 2016, the US Intelligence Community (USIC) put out an advisory and initial assessment discussing the Russian attacks on the United States of America and the threat posed to the elections.

  Following the election in January 2017, the Director of US National Intelligence put out a more comprehensive and final report.

  Excerpt of January 2017 Intelligence Assessment:

  Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections ICA 2017-01D 6 January 2017. Key Judgments Russian efforts to influence the 2016 US presidential election represent the most recent expression of Moscow’s longstanding desire to undermine the US-led liberal democratic order, but these activities demonstrated a significant escalation in directness, level of activity, and scope of effort compared to previous operations. We assess Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered an influence campaign in 2016 aimed at the US presidential election. Russia’s goals were to undermine public faith in the US democratic process, denigrate Secretary Clinton, and harm her electability and potential presidency. We further assess Putin and the Russian Government developed a clear preference for President-elect Trump. We have high confidence in these judgments.

  ∙ We also assess Putin and the Russian Government aspired to help President-elect Trump’s election chances when possible by discrediting Secretary Clinton and publicly contrasting her unfavorably to him. All three agencies agree with this judgment. CIA and FBI have high confidence in this judgment; NSA has moderate confidence.

  ∙ Moscow’s approach evolved over the course of the campaign based on Russia’s understanding of the electoral prospects of the two main candidates. When it appeared to Moscow that Secretary Clinton was likely to win the election, the Russian influence campaign began to focus more on undermining her future presidency.

  ∙ Further information has come to light since Election Day that, when combined with Russian behavior since early November 2016, increases our confidence in our assessments of Russian motivations and goals. Moscow’s influence campaign followed a Russian messaging strategy that blends covert intelligence operations—such as cyber activity—with overt efforts by Russian Government agencies, state-funded media, third-party intermediaries, and paid social media users or “trolls.” Russia, like its Soviet predecessor, has a history of conducting covert influence campaigns focused on US presidential elections that have used intelligence officers and agents and press placements to disparage candidates perceived as hostile to the Kremlin.

  ∙ Russia’s intelligence services conducted cyber operations against targets associated with the 2016 US presidential election, including targets associated with both major US political parties.

  ∙ We assess with high confidence that Russian military intelligence (General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate or GRU) used the Guccifer 2.0 persona and DCLeaks.com to release US victim data

  Chapter 14.

  Mueller Report April 2019 (Redacted Version excerpts relevant to this Book.)

  For more information on the redacted Mueller Report, please see: https://www.justice.gov/storage/report.pdf

  INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME I

  This report is submitted to the Attorney General pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 600.8(c), which states that, "[a]t the conclusion of the Special Counsel' s work, he ... shall provide the Attorney General a confidential report explaining the prosecution or declination decisions [the Special Counsel] reached."

  The Russian government interfered in the 2016 presidential election in sweeping and systematic fashion. Evidence of Russian government operations began to surface in mid-2016.

  In June, the Democratic National Committee and its cyber response team publicly announced that Russian hackers had compromised its computer network. Releases of hacked materials-hacks that public reporting soon attributed to the Russian government-began that same month.

  Additional releases followed in July through the organization WikiLeaks, with further releases in October and November. In late July 2016, soon after WikiLeaks's first release of stolen documents, a foreign government contacted the FBI about a May 2016 encounter with Trump Campaign foreign policy advisor George Papadopoulos.

  Papadopoulos had suggested to a representative of that foreign government that the Trump Campaign had received indications from the Russian government that it could assist the Campaign through the anonymous release of information damaging to Democratic presidential candidate Hillary Clinton.

  That information prompted the FBI on July 31, 2016, to open an investigation into whether individuals associated with the Trump Campaign were coordinating with the Russian government in its interference activities.

  That fall, two federal agencies jointly announced that the Russian government "directed recent compromises of e-mails from US persons and institutions, including US political organizations," and, "[t]hese thefts and disclosures are intended to interfere with the US election process."

  After the election, in late December 2016, the United States imposed sanctions on Russia for having interfered in the election. By early 2017, several congressional committees were examining Russia's interference in the election.

  Within the Executive Branch, these investigatory efforts ultimately led to the May 2017 appointment of Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller, III. The order appointing the Special Counsel authorized him to investigate "the Russian government's efforts to interfere in the 2016 presidential election," including any links or coordination between the Russian government and individuals associated with t
he Trump Campaign.

  As set forth in detail in this report, the Special Counsel's investigation established that Russia interfere~ in the 2016 presidential election principally through two operations.

  First, a Russian entity carried out a social media campaign that favored presidential candidate Donald J. Trump and disparaged presidential candidate Hillary Clinton.

  Second, a Russian intelligence service conducted computer-intrusion operations against entities, employees, and volunteers working on the Clinton Campaign and then released stolen documents.

  The investigation also identified numerous links between the Russian government and the Trump Campaign. Although the investigation established that the Russian government perceived it would benefit from a Trump presidency and worked to secure that outcome, and that the Campaign expected it would benefit electorally from information stolen and released through Russian efforts, the investigation did not establish that members of the Trump Campaign conspired or coordinated with the Russian government in its election interference activities.

  * * *

  Below we describe the evidentiary considerations underpinning statements about the results of our investigation and the Special Counsel's charging decisions, and we then provide an overview of the two volumes of our report.

  The report describes actions and events that the Special Counsel's Office found to be supported by the evidence collected in our investigation. In some instances, the report points out the absence of evidence or conflicts in the evidence about a particular fact or event.

  In other instances, when substantial, credible evidence enabled the Office to reach a conclusion with confidence, the report states that the investigation established that certain actions or events occurred.

  A statement that the investigation did not establish particular facts does not mean there was no evidence of those facts. In evaluating whether evidence about collective action of multiple individuals constituted a crime, we applied the framework of conspiracy law, not the concept of "collusion."

  In so doing, the Office recognized that the word "collud[ e ]" was used in communications with the Acting Attorney General confirming certain aspects of the investigation's scope and that the term has frequently been invoked in public reporting about the investigation.

  But collusion is not a specific offense or theory of liability found in the United States Code, nor is it a term of art in federal criminal law. For those reasons, the Office's focus in analyzing questions of joint criminal liability was on conspiracy as defined in federal law.

  In connection with that analysis, we addressed the factual question whether members of the Trump Campaign " coordinated"-a term that appears in the appointment order-with Russian election interference activities.

  Like collusion, "coordination" does not have a settled definition in federal criminal law.

  We understood coordination to require an agreement-tacit or express-between the Trump Campaign and the Russian government on election interference.

  That requires more than the two parties taking actions that were informed by or responsive to the other's actions or interests.

  We applied the term coordination in that sense when stating in the report that the investigation did not establish that the Trump Campaign coordinated with the Russian government in its election interference activities.

  * * *

  The report on our investigation consists of two volumes: Volume I describes the factual results of the Special Counsel's investigation of Russia's interference in the 2016 presidential election and its interactions with the Trump Campaign.

  Section I describes the scope of the investigation. Sections II and III describe the principal ways Russia interfered in the 2016 presidential election. Section IV describes links between the Russian · government and individuals associated with the Trump Campaign.

  -----------

  Volume II addresses the President's actions towards the FBI's investigation into Russia's interference in the 2016 presidential election and related matters, and his actions towards the Special Counsel' s investigation.

  Volume II separately states its framework and the considerations that guided that investigation.

  EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TO VOLUME I

  RUSSIAN SOCIAL MEDIA CAMPAIGN

  The Internet Research Agency (IRA) carried out the earliest Russian interference operations identified by the investigation-a social media campaign designed to provoke and amplify political and social discord in the United States.

  The IRA was based in St. Petersburg, Russia, and received funding from Russian oligarch Yevgeniy Prigozhin and companies he controlled.

  Prigozhin is widely reported to have ties to Russian President Vladimir Putin. In mid-2014, the IRA sent them the mission with instructions

  The IRA later used social media accounts and interest groups to sow discord in the US political system through what it termed "information warfare."

  The campaign evolved from a generalized program designed in 2014 and 2015 to undermine the US electoral system, to a targeted operation that by early 2016 favored candidate Trump and disparaged candidate Clinton.

  The IRA' s operation also included the purchase of political advertisements on social media in the names of US persons and entities, as well as the staging of political rallies inside the United States.

  To organize those rallies, IRA employees posed as US grassroots entities and persons and made contact with Trump supporters and Trump Campaign officials in the United States.

  The investigation did not identify evidence that any US persons conspired or coordinated with the IRA. Section II of this report details the Office's investigation of the Russian social media campaign.

  RUSSIAN HACKING OPERATIONS

  At the same time that the IRA operation began to focus ·on supporting candidate Trump in early 2016, the Russian government employed a second form of interference: cyber intrusions (hacking) and releases of hacked materials damaging to the Clinton Campaign.

  The Russian intelligence service known as the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Army (GRU) carried out these operations. In March 2016, the GRU began hacking the email accounts of Clinton Campaign volunteers and employees, including campaign chairman John Podesta.

  In April 2016, the GRU hacked into the computer networks of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC) and the Democratic National Committee (DNC).

  The GRU stole hundreds of thousands of documents from the compromised email accounts and networks.

  Around the time that the DNC announced in mid-June 2016 the Russian government's role in hacking its network, the GRU began disseminating stolen materials through the fictitious online personas " DCLeaks" and "Guccifer 2.0."

  The GRU later released additional materials through the organization of the presidential campaign of Donald J. Trump ("Trump Campaign" or "Campaign") showed interest in WikiLeaks' s releases of documents and welcomed their potential to damage candidate Clinton.

  Beginning in June 2016, forecast to senior Campaign officials that WikiLeaks would release information damaging to candidate Clinton. WikiLeaks' s first release came in July 2016.

  Around the same time, candidate Trump announced that he hoped Russia would recover emails described as missing from a private server used by Clinton when she was Secretary of State; he later said that he was speaking sarcastically.

  WikiLeaks began releasing Podesta' s stolen emails on October 7, 2016, less than one hour after a U.S. media outlet released video considered damaging to candidate Trump.

  Section lII of this Report details the Office's investigation into the Russian hacking operations, as well as other efforts by Trump Campaign supporters to obtain Clinton-related emails.

  RUSSIAN CONTACTS WITH THE CAMPAIGN

  The social media campaign and the GRU hacking operations coincided with a series of contacts between Trump Campaign officials and individuals with ties to the Russian government.

  The O
ffice investigated whether those contacts reflected or resulted in the Campaign conspiring or coordinating with Russia in its election-interference activities.

  Although the investigation established that the Russian government perceived it would benefit from a Trump presidency and worked to secure that outcome, and that the Campaign expected it would benefit electorally from information stolen and released through Russian efforts, the investigation did not establish that members of the Trump Campaign conspired or coordinated with the Russian government in its election interference activities.

  The Russian contacts consisted of business connections, offers of assistance to the Campaign, invitations for candidate Trump and Putin to meet in person, invitations for Campaign officials and representatives of the Russian government to meet, and policy positions seeking improved US-Russian relations.

  Section IV of this Report details the contacts between Russia and the Trump Campaign during the campaign and transition periods, the most salient of which are summarized below in chronological order.

  2015.

  Some of the earliest contacts were made in connection with a Trump Organization real-estate project in Russia known as Trump Tower Moscow. Candidate Trump signed a Letter of lntent for Trump Tower Moscow by November 2015, and in January 2016 Trump Organization executive Michael Cohen emailed and spoke about the project with the office of Russian government press secretary Dmitry Peskov. The Trump Organization pursued the project through at least June 2016, including by considering travel to Russia by Cohen and candidate Trump.

  Spring 2016.

  Campaign foreign policy advisor George Papadopoulos made early contact with Joseph Mifsud, a London-based professor who had connections to Russia and traveled to Moscow in April 2016.

  Immediately upon his return to London from that trip, Mifsud told Papadopoulos that the Russian government had "dirt" on Hillary Clinton in the form of thousands of emails.